How Credible is Anglo-French Nuclear Deterrence?
An Analysis of the New Nuclear Balance of Power in Europe
In 1961, French President Charles de Gaulle denounced what he perceived as a dangerous cycle of European nuclear dependency upon the United States, calling upon all Western European nations to reduce their military reliance on the US nuclear arsenal for their long-term security. De Gaulle’s warnings about Europe’s deepening nuclear dependency on the US (known as the ‘Gaullist critique’) were largely ignored during the Cold War, and continued to be dismissed during the ‘post-historical’ 1990s as nuclear weapons phased out of the international discourse.
Today, however, as US President Donald Trump openly questions America’s commitment to NATO’s defense, French President Emmanuel Macron has revived de Gaulle’s strategic vision by urging Europe to reconsider its reliance on US nuclear guarantees. On March 5th, 2025, Macron pressed European nations to “(re)open the strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent by our (nuclear) deterrent.” As Britain and France — the two nuclear powers in Europe — confront the threat of renewed Russian aggression amid Trump’s waning commitments to NATO, a critical question has consumed the European defense debate: Can Anglo-French nuclear power replace US nuclear guarantees to deter Russia in the future?
During the Ukraine War, the specter of nuclear weapons use re-emerged as Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu outlined “redlines” that could prompt the Kremlin to breach the post-1945 nuclear taboo. According to David Sanger’s New Cold Wars and Bob Woodward’s War, the Biden Administration’s approach drew on Cold War-era lessons, carefully balancing the strategic stakes of nuclear escalation in Ukraine while countering Moscow’s attempts to normalize nuclear threats. Despite these efforts, nuclear decision-making between 2022 and 2025 became increasingly fraught. This complexity has deepened with the erosion of the US nuclear guarantee under the second Trump Administration. As Washington and Moscow move closer to signing a bilateral peace deal at Ukraine’s expense, Europe faces a drastically altered strategic landscape where the nuclear balance has shifted decisively in Putin’s favor. The threat of renewed Russian aggression in Eastern Europe looms large in Brussels, forcing the Europeans to reconsider their dependence on the US as its commitments waver.
This article explores the theoretical concept of Anglo-French extended deterrence, examining its history, enduring risks, and prospects for success without US support. While an semi-integrated Anglo-French strategy is essential for credible nuclear deterrence, Britain and France should also each retain a degree of strategic independence from the other to maximize strategic ambiguity. This approach has historically enhanced NATO’s nuclear credibility rather than undermining it, and appears the only feasible option given the vastly divergent strategic cultures in London and Paris. A single, fully-integrated “Eurodeterrent” is misleading, while Anglo-French deterrence remains a far more conceivable prospect, though still not without significant determination and coordination between London and Paris, and within the EU and NATO. In their joint quest to reestablish European security, London and Paris face significant challenges from both existing military realities on the ground and their persistent strategic divide: the solution to Europe’s current impasse, therefore, must fully acknowledge these.
The Evolution of Anglo-French Nuclear Doctrine
Since the early years of the Cold War, Britain and France have navigated the complexities of nuclear deterrence with distinct national approaches, each balancing their commitments to NATO with independent strategic doctrines designed to address unique national priorities. Britain and France both maintain a ‘minimum deterrent,’ or the ability to credibly retaliate with nuclear weapons against an aggressor threatening their homelands. However, in 2025, London and Paris lack the nuclear wherewithal and established strategic doctrine to ensure ‘extended deterrence’ in Eastern Europe — in short, the commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend non-nuclear allies — a role historically fulfilled by the United States.
When Britain conducted its first successful atomic test, Hurricane, in 1952, London defied US wishes that NATO’s nuclear decision-making remain centralized in Washington. However, after Moscow’s launch of Sputnik in 1957 sparked fears of Soviet ICBM superiority, the US and UK began sharing nuclear technologies through the Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA). During the 1960s, the UK became technologically reliant on the US for their submarine-launched deterrent, Polaris, upgraded during the 1980s to another US-provided system, Trident. Although successive British governments have affirmed the independence of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, their policies only deepened London’s reliance on US nuclear infrastructure.
France, by comparison, was excluded from these early nuclear agreements and achieved nuclear weapons independently by 1960. De Gaulle was far more sceptical of US guarantees than British officials, scorning repeated attempts by the Kennedy Administration to integrate French nuclear weapons into a Multilateral Force (MLF) operated jointly by NATO. He famously questioned whether the Americans would truly “trade New York for Paris,” and perceived nuclear weapons as the only means of ensuring France’s recognition as a major power. Throughout the 1960s, de Gaulle spearheaded the development of a credible nuclear triad designed to ensure the protection of France’s “vital interests” upon the basic assumption that US support was unreliable. In 1967, France withdrew from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and Integrated Military Command, cementing Paris as an independent nuclear actor, and rejecting any future integration with US or NATO strategy to prevent France’s “subordination” to the will of external powers.
During the Cold War, both nations defended that their independent deterrents provided an essential measure of uncertainty in the event of a conflict between NATO and the Soviet Union, an argument which extends to present-day concerns regarding the Russian Federation. Moscow was forced to reckon with both British and French nuclear decision-making in addition to the United States when contemplating escalation, lessening the overall likelihood of a major war. However, the exact conditions under which Britain or France would employ nuclear weapons apart from the US was kept intentionally vague, accounting for their smaller arsenals and, in Britain’s case, its enduring technological dependency across the Atlantic Ocean. Paris’ force de dissuasion doctrine relied on an even bolder strategy of ambiguity, premised as it was upon the complete independence of French decision-making and the unknowability of France’s response.
In the post-Cold War era, US global dominance and the dissolution of the USSR diminished the strategic rationale for maintaining independent British and French nuclear deterrents. Although the US and Russia pursued arms control treaties to reduce the amount of forward-deployed nuclear missiles in Europe, many European officials continued to assert the value of British and French nuclear weapons in the interest of the continent’s long-term strategic autonomy. The 1992 Franco-British Nuclear Commission identified potential areas for collaboration between London and Paris, noting key doctrinal similarities, but failed to forge a comprehensive Anglo-French deterrent posture involving joint targeting and integration. In 1995, French President Jacques Chirac publicly declared solidarity with the UK, affirming that “no circumstances (would) threaten France’s vital interests without also threatening Britain’s.” But despite the assertion, few tangible steps were taken after 1995 to realize what RAND analysts, in a study the same year, termed a “European Vocation.” Olivier Debouzy’s analysis highlighted France’s independence from the NPG as the primary obstacle to achieving a unified Anglo-French nuclear deterrence posture, underscoring the enduring strategic divergence between the two nations.
After new global threats materialized after September 11th, 2001, and conventional forces began to outshine nuclear weapons in international affairs, the core challenges of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation persisted. Despite the promising Lancaster House Treaties in 2010, the “technical mismatch” between US-dependent British Trident delivery systems and independently developed French nuclear weapons remained unresolved, hampering efforts at integration. Unfortunately, during the period when serious collaboration was possible and desirable with regard to Europe’s long-term security, Anglo-French officials failed to rectify the key technical and doctrinal issues between London and Paris. Without any reason to alter their doctrines nor doubt the reliability of US security guarantees, the issue would be tabled until the 2020s.
The New Balance of Terror in Europe
The outbreak of the Ukraine War in 2022 triggered seismic shifts in Europe’s nuclear landscape, redrawing what Henry Kissinger once termed the ‘delicate balance of terror.’ While Britain and France played crucial roles in reinforcing NATO’s solidarity against Russian aggression, their efforts were largely supplementary to Washington’s leadership. However, as the period between 2022 and 2025 unfolded, strong initial prospects for victory over Russia in Ukraine have given way to a strategic dangerous impasse. Trump’s turnaround of the Biden Administration’s policies has thoroughly undercut prospects for a decisive victory in Ukraine, and left Britain and France to fill Washington’s shoes overnight. In this new strategic reality, the evolving nuclear balance of power between the US, Russia, the UK, France and the EU appears set to redefine the European security calculus for decades to come.
The United States — 1,770 (100 TNW)
The United States remains the dominant nuclear power in Europe, maintaining 1,770 deployed strategic nuclear weapons alongside roughly 100 tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) stationed in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. These TNWs comprise the core of NATO’s extended deterrence, as in theory they can be introduced at a far lower threshold of warfare than general nuclear war, such as in response to an unexpected Russian conventional attack. However, despite its technologically superiority, the US arsenal of TNWs remains quantitatively inferior to Russia’s.
In 2025, Trump reversed Biden-era efforts to expand and modernize this force, instead explicitly stating the US would “not defend” NATO allies failing to meet defense spending targets. Furthermore, in pursuit of a bilateral peace deal with Putin over Ukraine, Trump temporarily paused military aid, undermining US security guarantees and compelling Britain, France, and the EU to explore alternative deterrence solutions. Trump’s approach can thus be characterized as one of ‘strategic uncertainty,’ designed to maximize US leverage by liquidating what were previously held to be inviolable American defense commitments.
The Russian Federation — 1,700 (2,000 TNW)
With the apparent withdrawal of the United States, Russia is on track to become the continent’s new dominant nuclear power. Beyond its arsenal of 1,700 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, Moscow possesses an estimated 2,000 TNWs, though exact numbers remain classified. Since 2023, Moscow has strategically positioned these weapons in Belarus, deploying dual-capable Iskander missile systems and Su-25 aircraft modified for nuclear delivery.
Further escalating tensions, in 2024 Putin revised Russian nuclear doctrine to explicitly permit nuclear retaliation against “critical threats to (Russia’s) sovereignty,” a shift from the previous focus on threats to Russia's “existence.” Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly issued nuclear threats related to the conflict in Ukraine, including potential strikes against “decision-making centers” in NATO states if Western weapons target Russian territory. Between 2022 and 2024, over 50 explicit nuclear threats emanated from Russian officials, frequently linked to specific Western arms deliveries or Ukrainian advances.
These threats have targeted Kyiv, London, and Berlin, with Russian official Dmitry Medvedev warning of a “nuclear apocalypse” in the event of direct NATO intervention against Russia. Moscow frames its nuclear posture as a “de-escalation” tool, aiming to freeze conflicts on terms favorable to the Kremlin by exploiting strategic ambiguity and undermining NATO cohesion. It now appears highly probable that Putin’s nuclear threats will intensify, particularly if the Trump Administration continues to signal indifference to Europe’s security and European nuclear forces remain quantitatively inferior.
France — 290 (~114 TNW)
France is currently the third most powerful nuclear nation in Europe, maintaining a nuclear force of 290 deployed operational strategic warheads, 64 M51 tactical nuclear missiles (TNWs) on four Triomphant-class submarines, and 50 additional ASMP-A air-launched missiles (TNWs) compatible with French-produced Dassault Rafale aircraft. Since the beginning of the Ukraine War, President Macron has asserted a “European dimension of French vital interests” which these nuclear instruments are employed to protect, expanded France’s NATO military presence in Eastern Europe, and supplied advanced systems like Caesar howitzers to Ukrainian forces. Amid signs of waning US commitment to European defense, incidentally under Biden, Macron shifted his stance on NATO membership for Ukraine, endorsing it at the June 2023 Vilnius Summit as a crucial security guarantee against future instances of Russian aggression.
With Trump’s return to power, Macron has intensified French efforts to bolster European strategic autonomy, particularly in the nuclear arena. In March 2025, following Trump’s statements undermining European defense, Macron circulated extended deterrence proposals to EU partners, advocating confidential talks on joint exercises, strategic dialogues, and the potential deployment of French nuclear assets in Eastern Europe. Macron has thus taken major steps towards a credible extended deterrence posture but, crucially, without relinquishing French decision-making independence, a stance that has generated both support and consternation within Europe.
The United Kingdom — 225 (0 TNW)
The United Kingdom remains the weakest of Europe’s nuclear powers, but has taken action to address Europe’s emerging strategic challenges, albeit without relinquishing London’s Atlanticist tilt. Even prior to the outbreak of the Ukraine War, Britain reversed its decades-long trend of nuclear disarmament by raising its stockpile cap to 260 warheads, currently fielding an arsenal of around 225, with 120 others available for deployment. While the UK government has stressed the necessity of preserving Britain’s “independence” as a nuclear actor, often by investing in new modernization programs like the Dreadnought submarine and A21/Mk7 warhead designs, the UK currently possesses no deployable TNWs.
Demonstrating its commitment to NATO, Britain denounced Russia as the alliance’s “most acute direct threat” and has provided substantial support to Ukraine. Since 2022, the UK has provided Ukraine with £9.3 billion in military aid, advanced weapons systems including Storm Shadow missiles, and trained over 45,000 Ukrainian soldiers. However, Britain’s Trident II D5 missiles remain deeply dependent on US infrastructure for maintenance and targeting, a strategic vulnerability that London has taken limited action to mitigate. This enduring orientation has led London to prioritize alliances like AUKUS over EU defense post-Brexit, thus far precluding any meaningful path to an integrated ‘Eurodeterrent’ given Trident’s inherent US dependency.
The European Union — 0 (0 TNW)
The European Union has no nuclear arsenal of its own, but since 2022 has encouraged Britain and France to invest in higher level strategic planning while urging non-nuclear member states to develop their conventional weaponry. By 2024, EU defense spending rose to over €326 billion, complemented by an €800 billion package for air defense, drones, and joint procurement under the European Defence Readiness 2030 roadmap.
However, the return of US uncertainty under Trump has exposed deep divisions among EU officials. Some advocate embracing Anglo-French deterrence as a viable alternative to US security guarantees, while others resist this approach, fearing a break with nonproliferation standards if it fails, and Eastern European countries pursue independent nuclear options for themselves. Newly elected German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has championed EU financial contributions to bolster Anglo-French nuclear deterrence by building upon agreements such as the 2024 Trinity House Accord. Although most EU officials emphasize nonproliferation, there are signs Poland and other Eastern European nations might already be exploring nuclear options, despite the reality that these deterrents could never achieve credibility quickly enough to significantly influence the existing balance of power.
Even with the theoretical subtraction of the United States, the conventional balance of power in Europe is roughly equal. Russia has over 1 million active troops and 2 million reservists, but has sustained over 200,000 casualties in Ukraine. Moscow refurbished and produced 1,500 tanks and 2,800 armored vehicles in 2024, but continues to rely heavily on outdated, Soviet-era equipment. By comparison, European NATO members collectively field 1.8 million active troops, supplied with more advanced weaponry including Leopard 2 tanks, CV90 IFVs, and Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. Europe lacks the centralized command structure of the Russian military, of course, and roughly 80% of European defense procurement relies on non-European suppliers, primarily the US. Ultimately, however, this means that the extent to which Britain and France innovate in their approaches to nuclear deterrence without the US looms especially large in the Kremlin’s military calculus, marking the matter of quintessential strategic importance.
Strategic Solutions
Around the world, think tanks have begun to contemplate the prospects for Anglo-French nuclear deterrence amid Donald Trump’s unprecedented policy shifts. Their conclusions are mixed, but certain insights stand out as prescient when considering the longer history of the Anglo-French strategic nuclear debate.
Field Anglo-French Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Eastern Europe
The most obvious solution Britain and France can pursue is to create and expand their arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. In their recent article for Foreign Affairs, Mark S. Bell and Fabian R. Hoffmann of RealClear World urged Britain and France to reestablish extended deterrence by fielding TNWs in Eastern Europe. They argue that this involves a “trade-off” — jeopardizing the strategic stability of the region — but also warn that the cost of inaction is to compel Eastern European countries to violate nonproliferation norms by pursuing independent nuclear programs. Bell and Hoffman’s views present a reasonably actionable solution for both London and Paris to pursue, irrespective of existing doctrinal differences across the Channel.
Pursue Anglo-French “Overlapping” Deterrence, not an Integrated ‘Eurodeterrent’
In contrast to calls for full nuclear integration under a ‘Eurodeterrent,’ a more nuanced approach might be to instead capitalize on Britain and France’s existing strategic autonomy to maximize Europe’s strategic ambiguity. While institutions like Chatham House and CSIS have urged Macron to rejoin the NPG to enhance France’s nuclear credibility, relinquishing Paris’s historical nuclear autonomy might prove difficult, misleading and even counterproductive, especially while Europe’s nuclear hand remains weaker than Moscow’s. Instead, Paris should collaborate with London and Brussels to integrate specific aspects of Anglo-French nuclear strategy — notably, the coordinated stationing of TNWs in Eastern Europe — while preserving the strategic advantages of either’s nuclear independence.
As in the Cold War, this ambiguity would grant Europe a critical advantage, while still providing the continent with long-term geopolitical autonomy from Russia and the United States. In practice, Britain and France could provide “overlapping” extended deterrence guarantees, and potentially agree upon top secret protocols to divide up responsibility pragmatically within a credible escalation ladder. Beyond modernizing its nuclear deterrent, Paris should also develop political strategies that leverage its long-standing tradition of independence to Europe’s overall advantage, maximizing the prerogatives inherent to being the only nuclear decision-maker in the EU at Putin’s expense.
Rebalance British Nuclear Dependence with the French Supply Chain
Another solution is to mitigate the UK’s dependency on US infrastructure by urging London to begin purchasing nuclear components from the French defense supply chain. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), albeit like Chatham House in its call for integration between Anglo-French nuclear strategy, made a supplemental observation that Britain’s position as an independent nuclear power would be enhanced by balancing its infrastructural dependence between the US and France. Even if London only begins this shift in 2025, it would allow Britain to retain its Atlanticist tilt while investing into European defence simultaneously. In light of the UK’s lack of TNWs, it would be advantageous for Britain and France to cooperate in this field first, before exploring other avenues of research and development.
Win the Socioeconomic Battle for Nuclear Weapons with European Solidarity
Finally, Britain and France must collaboratively preempt the political fallout from reintroducing nuclear weapons into the mainstream European security equation. As the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) has noted, public resistance in France and Europe to embracing nuclear weapons for the continent’s security is a formidable socioeconomic hurdle, necessitating burden-sharing mechanisms within the EU to fund and support Anglo-French modernization efforts. While the political and economic battles inherent in realizing a “European Vocation” are substantial, as Starmer and Macron appear to already recognize that they are also unavoidable. Therefore, the time to refine, coordinate and embolden Anglo-French nuclear deterrence is now, before Moscow capitalizes on a bilateral peace deal with Washington and while Russian forces remain entangled in Ukraine. Although overcoming political resistance to nuclear modernization may be the greatest challenge in providing Europe with long-term strategic autonomy, Britain, France, and the EU cannot afford to delay action amidst escalating uncertainty.
Conclusion
As Starmer and Macron navigate a shifting strategic landscape, their quest to forge a “Coalition of the Willing” capable of deterring Russian aggression in a post-American Europe represents a bold redefinition of European power. This endeavor, while fraught with trade-offs and escalation risks, hinges on proactive preparations to counter potential Russian escalation by employing lessons learned from the Cold War regarding nuclear deterrence. Britain and France need not pursue full integration under a ‘Eurodeterrent,’ but rather, can enhance coordination between EU partners, and form a credible strategy of ambiguity coordinated by London and Paris at Putin’s expense. Rather than estimating the resolve of a single European decision-maker, the Kremlin will instead have to grapple with two decision centers, each committed to the defense of Europe.
This will require both adjustments to Anglo-French nuclear doctrine and innovative strategies from Britain, France, and the EU to establish credible European strategic autonomy. Although they may remain operationally independent, London and Paris should establish that their nuclear arsenals serve many of the same objectives — namely, the security of Europe — and should work together to enhance their respective strategic leverage in the overall European interest. Beyond the immediate challenges posed by US strategic uncertainty, the “European Vocation” is essential for European prosperity in a multipolar world, as it offers them greater geopolitical influence regardless of the state of transatlantic or Eurasian relations. As the United States, Russia, and China vie for spheres of influence, the UK, France, and the EU must safeguard their citizens’ security and stability amidst rising geopolitical pressure. This is not to endorse irresponsible nuclear brinkmanship, but to encourage European decision-makers to think ahead rather than risk becoming overwhelmed by the course of unforeseen events. Without a credible nuclear deterrent, Europe risks vulnerability to a predatory Russia that has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to employ nuclear threats as tools of military coercion. The imperative for a strategic and rational response, therefore, has been effectively thrust upon Europe, and demands decisive action to ensure European security and stability in an increasingly perilous world.
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